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ADJUDGED that the petition of for relief, pursuant to CPLR Article 78, of petitioner
Gail Hanna is denied, and the petition is dismissed. And it is further

0

w

a:
a:
w
w

IL

a: ..
>-..s!!!..
..J z

ORDERED that counsel for Petitioner shall serve a copy of this Order with Notice of
Entry within twenty (20) days of entry on counsel for Respondent.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NEW YORK: lAS PART 35 ·

--------------------------------------------------------------------)(
In the Matter of the Application of GAIL HANNA,
Petitioner,
For a Judgment Pursuant to Article 78
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules

Index No.: 150140/18
DECISION/ORDER

-againstNEW YORK STATE BOARD OF PAROLE,
Respondent.

--------------------------------------------------------------------)(
HON. CAROL R. EDMEAD, JSC:
In this Article 78

proceedi~g,

petitioner Gail Hanna (Hanna) seeks a judgment to overturn

an order of the respondent New York State Board of Parole (Parole Board) as arbitrary and
capricious (motion sequence number 00 I). For the following reasons, this petition is denied.
FACTS
On October I 0, 1995, Hanna was convicted via plea bargain of the crimes of second
degree murder (Penal Law§ 125.25 [I)), and second degree criminal possession of a weapon
(Penal Law§ 265.03). See respondent's mem oflaw, exhibit A. She received an indeterminate
sentence of20 years to life, and was incarcerated at the Bedford Hills Correctional Facility until
20 I 0, when she was transferred to the Taconic Correctional Facility, where she now resides. See
petition,~~

21-22. Haf1-na is currently 68 years of age. Id., ~ 9.

On January I 0, 2017, Hanna appeared at a hearing before the Parole Board to petition for
her release from confinement. See petition,~ 33. The Parole Board denied her petition, but
directed that she could renew it in January 2019 (the Parole Board decision). !d.; exhibit A. On
May 17, 2017, Hanna filed an administrative appeal of the Parole Board's denial. !d.;
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44. On September I I, 2017, the Parole Board Commissioner's Office issued a decision that
denied Hanna 's administrative appeal (the Commissioner's decision). !d.;

petition,~

45. The

relevant portions of the Commissioner's decision will be quoted later, since it is rather lengthy
!d.; exhibit R. In any case, Hanna thereafter commenced this Article 78 proceeding to overturn

the Commissioner's decision as arbitrary and capricious (motion sequence number 001 ).
DISCUSSION
The standard of review that governs an Article 78 challenge to a Parole Board
determination is more stringent than that which is normally applied in Article 78 proceedings.
The Court of Appeals unequivocally states that "[i]n New York, the Parole Board holds the
power to decide whether to release a sentenced prisoner on parole," not the courts, and that, as a
result, "[j]udicial intervention is warranted only when there is a 'showing of.irrationality
bordering on impropriety."' Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 476 (2000). Here, after thoroughly
reviewing the record, the court finds that the petitioner has not made such a showing.
Executive Law (Exec Law)§ 259-i governs the "[p]rocedures for the conduct of the work
of the state board of parole," and provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
"Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as a reward for good
conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if
there is a reasonable probabi lity that, if such inmate is released, he will live and
remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release is ·not incompatible
with the welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness ofhis crime
as to undermine respect for law. In making the parole release decision, the
procedures.adopted pursuant to subdivision four of section two hundred
fifty-nine-c of this article shall require that the following be considered: (i) the
institutional record including program goals and accomplislunents, academic
achievements, vocational education, training or work assignments, therapy and
interactions with staff and inmates; (ii) performance, if any, as a participant in a
temporary release program; (iii) release plans including community resources,
employment, education and training and support services available to the inmate;
2
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(iv) any deportation order issued by the federal government against the inmate
while in the custody of the department and any recommendation regarding
deportation made by the commissioner of the department pursuant to section one
hundred forty-seven of the correction law; (v) any current or prior statement made
to the board by the crime victim or the victim's representative, where the crime
victim is deceased or is mentally or physically incapacitated; (vi) the length of the
determinate sentence to which the inmate would be subject had he or she received
a sentence pursuant to section 70.70 or section 70.71 of the penal law for a felony
defined in article two hundred twenty or article two hundred twenty-one of the
penal law; (vii) the seriousness of the offense with due consideration to the type of
sentence, length of sentence and recommendations of the sentencing court, the
di strict attorney, the attorney for the inmate, the pre-sentence probation report as
well as consideration of any mitigating and aggravating factors, and activities
following arrest prior to confinement; and (viii) prior criminal record, including
the nature and pattern of offenses, adjustment to any previous probation or parole
supervision and institutional confinement .... "
Exec Law § 259-i (2) (c) (A). Here, Hanna's counsel rai se five arguments that the Parole Board
violated the foregoing statutory proce<;lures when it rendered its September 11, 2017 decision.
The court will review each argument in turn.
First, counsel for Hanna asserts that "the Parole Board abused its discretion and violated
lawful procedures by relying on erroneous information regarding [petitioner's] record." See
petitioner's mem of law at 7- 14. Counsel avers that this "erroneous information" consists of
non-existent " letters of opposition" to Hanna's parole application that one of the Parole Board
Commissioners referred to at Hanna' s January 10, 2017 hearing. Jd. Counsel specifically
objects that the sole "letter of opposi tion" was, in fact, a November 24, 1995 letter that the
Warren County District Attorney's Office prepared shortly after Hanna was originally sentenced,
and asserts that neither the Warren County District Attorney, the DOC or any other official
actually submitted any new " letters of opposition" to her 2017 parole application, despite the
Commissioner's apparent claim to the contrary. !d. The court notes that counsel raised this same

3
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argument at Hanna's September 11, 2017 administrative appeal, and that the Commissioner's
Office decision disposed of it in the following excerpt:
"Appellant's first contention is that the Board relied on erroneous
information, arguing that a commissioner's reference to letters of opposition from
~fficial sources received in response to inquiries from DOCCS amounts an error
requiring a de novo interview. While appellant is correct that the reliance on
erroneous information may provide grounds for appeal (see 9 NYCRR §
. 8006.3(a]; see e.g., Matter of Plevy v Travis, 17 AD3d 879, 880 (3d Dept 2005]),
the mere presence of erroneous information, without any indication it was relied
upon in the determination, is insufficient to require the decision be vacated (see
Matter of Restivo v New York State Board of Parole, 70 AD 3d 1096, 1097 [3d
Dept. 201 0]). This is so even where the erroneous information amounts to an
inaccurate statement by a member of the Board during the interview not relied
upon in the decision (see Maller of Gordon v Stanford, 148 AD 3d 1502, 1503 [3d
Dept 20 17]; Matter of Khatib v N(!W York State Bd. of Parole, 118 AD 3d 1207,
1208 [3d Dept 2014]).
"The record reflects that the Board did not rely on erroneous information
in rendering its decision. The Board is required to consider any recommendation
from the prosecutor, which in the case of appellant, was the Warren County
District Attorney (see Executive Law §259-i [2] [c) (A] [vii]). The Board
received a letter from the office of this District Attorney which the Board then
considered as required by law (see id.). Although appellant refers to an email
from an attorney in the office of Counsel to the Department of Corrections and
Community Supervision ('DOCCS') to·support her claim that no correspondence
from the District Attorney or sentencing court was received by the Board, the full
text of the email included as an exhibit in the brief on appeal reflects the opposite,
noting that in 1995 the Board received a letter from the Warren County District
Attorney's Office. That the Board may have been mistaken as to whether this
letter was sent in response to the 2014 request does not alter the Board's
obligation to consider it. Nor is the reference during the interview to 'letters' in
the plural an error requiring the determination be vacated; while the commissioner
may have misspoken during the interview, the decision itself accurately describes
'official opposition', (see Matter of Gordon, 148 AD3d at 1503).
"Notably, there is no indication or allegation that the letter from the
District Attorney contains a factual inaccuracy. Thus, appellant's reliance on
Matter of Comfort is misplaced; in that case, unlike here, the letters of opposition
at issue contained a factual misrepresentation as to the nature of the instant
offense (see Mdtter ofComfort v New York State Bd. of Parole, 101 AD3d 1450,
1451 (3d Dept. 20 12] ('Given this misrepresent~tion regarding petitioner's
4
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convictions, and it appearing that the 'significant' letters in opposition to
petitioner's release were prompted hy the erroneous characterization of
petitioner's conviction, it was error for the Board to credit those tainted letters')).
Consequently, appellant has not shown that she was prejudiced by any
consideration of inaccurate information by the Board (see Matter of Gordon v
Stanford, 148 AD3d at ·1503).''

See petition, exhibit R. In this portion of its decision, the Parole Board Commissioner's Office
correctly noted that Exec Law §259-i

(~)(c)

(A) (vii) requires the Parole Board to assess "the

seriousness of the offense with due consider~t ion to the type of sentence, length of sentence and
recommendations of the .. ·. district attorney, ... as well as ... any mitigating and aggravating
factors, and activities following arrest prior to confinement" when reviewing a parole request.
The Commissioner's office also found that the Parole Board had done so, because it indirectly
referred to the Warren County District Attorney's November 24, 1995 Jetter at Hanna's January
10, 2017 hearing. The Commissioner's Office. further found

tha~

that letter contained no

"erroneous information" irself, and noted that t~e "error" Hanna complained of appeared to be
the fact that no 11ew "letters of opposition" had been generated for submission at her 2017 parole
hearing. Finally, the Parole .Board Commissioner's
Office found that, in such circumstances,
.
.
controlling case law holds that consideration
of. such a letter is both required and permissible.
.
Having reviewed the record and the above~cited precedent, the court finds that the
Commissioner's office reasonably_ interpreted both the facts and the law. In her reply papers,
. Hanna nevertheless objects that she "preserved her claim that the ( 1995 letter) does not constitute
I

official opposition" to her parole application, and that, as of today, "no official opposition
exists." See petitioner's reply mem at 4-5. Hanna cites Matter of Gordon v Stanford (I 48 AD 3d
1502, 1503 (3d Dept 20 17)) to support her position. However, the Parole Board Commissioner's

5
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Office previously found that that decision was not on point, either factually .or on the law. Upon
reviewing that holding, the court agrees with the Parole Board Commissioner's Office's. Gordon
r

is distinguishable because it involved a glaring factual inaccuracy about the circumstances of a
fatal shooting, and does not involve "official opposition" letters to a parole request, at all.
Therefore, Gordon is not on point and does not support Hanna's position. As a result, there is no
justification for the court to alter the Commissioner's findin g, that the Parole Board did not rely
on "erroneous information," on the ground that this finding was an act of"irrationality bordering
on impropriety." It was not. That finding was, instead, entirely reasonable. Therefore, the court
rejects Hanna's first argument. .
Next, co unsel for Hanna argues that "the Parole Board impermissibly relied on the
Commissioners' erroneous personal beliefs" at the January 10, 2017 hearing. See petitioner's
mem of law at 14-24. Hanna specifically objects to the Parole Board 's alleged reliance on its
"personal beliefs" about three matters: 1) Hanna's "domestic abuse history; 2) Hanna's "mental
health;" and 3) Hanna's "crime." !d. at I 5. The court notes again that the Commissioner's
decision previously addressed these arguments. With respect to the first, Hanna's mental health,
the Commissioner's decision stated as follows:
"Appellant next contends that the Board improperly based its decision on personal
opinions, namely opinions regarding appellant's mental health and her description
of her relationship with the victim as abusive. Although the Board may not
consider factors 'outside the scope of the applicable statute,' the transcript and
decision do not reflect that the Board's determination was based upon such
non-statutory factors. (Matter of King, 83 NY2d 788). The record reflects that
appellant 's allegations of abuse by the victim and their impact upon her mental
state were inseparable from her explanation of why she committed the instant
offense; namely, that she killed the victim in the spur of the moment because she
feared hi s response to the imminent discovery of their financ ial straits and that
thi s fear was premised upon abuse perpetrated by th_e victim. Given the required
6
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consideration of the severity of the offense and the importance the Court of
Appeals has ascribed to assessing an inmate 's remorse and insight in evaluating
an inmate's rehabilitation, this consideration was entirely proper. (see Matter of
Silmon, 95 NY2d at 4 77).
"Appellant's argument that consideration of appellant's mental health history was
inappropriate is unpersuasive. The Board is expressly required to consider an
inmate's 'institutional record including ... therapy' (Executive Law §259-i [2] [c)
[A) [i]) and an inmate's mental health, including his or her history of menta l
illness and treatment, has been repeatedly found to be a pro per subject for Board
consideration, (see e.g. Matter ofGssime v New York State Div, ofParole, 84
AD 3d 1630 [3d Dept], lv. dismissed, 17 NY 3d 84 7 [20 II] [' Board also took into
account the mental health assistance provided to him during his. incarceration'];
Matter of Dudley v Travis, 227 AD2d 863 (3d Dept 1996) (' prior history of
mental il lness' appropriate consideration]; Matter ofBaker v Russi, 188 AD2d
771 (3d Dept 1992] [Board considered 'apparent need for psychological
counsel ing' ]).
" While appellant argues that the Board discussion of her mental health history
amounted to an improper diagnosis by someone who is not a mental health
professional, the record reflects that the Board made no such diagnosis. The
Board's inquiry was based on info rmation in the PreSentence Investigation Report
(the ' PS r Report'), which the Board is required to consider (see Executive Law§
259-i (2] [c] (A] [vii]). Appellant's rel iance on Peop le v Irwin (1 9 Misc3d
11 18(A] [Onondaga Co Ct 2008]) is misplaced; that case addressed the suitability
of material for inclusion in a ,PSI Report, not its consideration by the Board. Once
material is properly included in the PSJ Report, which the Board is required by
Executive Law§ 259-i (2) (c).(A) (vii) to consider, it may be relied upon by the
Board (see Matter of Carter v Evans, 81 AD3d l 031, I 031-32 (3d Dept 2011])
and appellant may not collaterally challenge its veracity in a parole interview (see
Mafler of Delrosario v Stanford, 140 AD 3d 1515 (3d Dept 20 16])."

See notice of motion, exhibit R. In Hanna's motion, counsel ave rs that it "does not cha llenge the
holdings of [the above cited case law], but emphasizes that the Board ... did more than simply
consider the facts surrounding Hanna's mental health; it inserted unfounded medical opinions
into the parole interview based on the commissioners' unqualified personal beliefs." See
petitioner' s mem of law at 19. However, this assertion is flatly contradicted by the portion of the
Commissioners' decision which found that the admini strative record showed that the Parole

7
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Board relied solely on the medi<;al opinions contained in Hanna's PSI report, rather than its own
purportedly "unfounded medical opinions." Having itself reviewed both the PSI report, and the

•

transcript of the parole Board's questioning at the January 10, 2017 hearing, the court agrees that
the commissioners' questions were, indeed, apparently drawn verbatim from the diagnoses
contained in the PSI report. See petition, exhibit A; respondent's mem of law, exhibit A (in
camera review only). As a result, the court finds that the Commissioner's fi nding, that the Parole
Board "made no such [improper med ical] diagnosis" in its initial determination, was a
reasonable, amply supported finding. Again, it was not an act of "irrationality bordering on
impropriety" that would warrant disturbing that finding. Therefore, the court rejects Harma's
"unfounded medical opinions" argument.
Counsel for Hanna also avers that "the Board impermissibly relied on the commissioners'
inaccurate personal beliefs about domestic abuse." See petitioner's mem of law at 19-24.
Counsel here made three specific complaints, including that: I) "first, the Board inappropriately
inferred that [Harma' s) history of abuse has not been addressed and that she needs further mental
health services"; 2) "second, the Board improperly based its decision on the commissioners'
beliefs that, if [the decedent] had truly been emotionally abusive to [Hanna] , she would have left
him or sought help from her children;" and 3) "third, the Board also improperly relied on its
personal beliefs that [Hanna] had a non-abusive relationship with [her victim)." /d., at 20, 22. In
its September 11, 2017 decision, the Commissioner' s Office addressed these three contentions,
. and made the following findi ngs:
"Contrary to· appellant's assertion, the Board properly considered her allegations
of abuse by the victim and their effect upon her mental state. Assessing the
veracity of these allegations amounts to a credibility determination within the

8
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Board's discretion (see Maller ofSiao-Pao v Dennison, 5 1 AD3d I 05, I08 [JS1
Dept 2008], afld, II NY3d 777 (2008]). The transcript reflects that appellant
initiated the discussion of abuse in her relationship with the victim in response to
an inquiry about the commission of the instant offense and that her parole packet
included a statement describing the role of abuse in the commission of the crime.
Given the prominence of these allegations of abuse in appellant's own account of
her crime, the Board 's resulting inquiry into the effect upon her inental health and
her mental state at the time of the instant offense was within the scope of the
statute, (see Matter of Dudley, 227 A02d 863; Matter of Baker, 188 AD2d 771;
compare Matter of King, 83 NY2d 788).
"Moreover, the record reflects that the Board's inquiry was directed towards .
assessing.hei- claim that the instant offense was not premeditated. As an inmate's
remorse and insight into their commission of the instant offense is h ighly relevant
to the Board's evaluation of rehabilitation, this inquiry was entirely proper, (see
Matter ofSilmon, 95 NY2d ar477). While appellant indicated in the interview
that the murder was an unplanned, impulsive act based upon her fear of the
victim, this was contradicted by statements made by the prosecutor during her
sentencing hearing arguing that she had, in fact, planned the murder ahead oftime,
citing arrangements made by appellant prior to the murder, including suspending
her mail, as well as the allegation that she had previously attempted to kiH the
victim discussed in the interview. Resolving these conflicting accounts amounted
to a credibility determination within the Board' s purview (see Matter ofSiao-Pao,
51 AD 3d at I 08)."

See notice of motion, exhibit R. Counsel for Harma nonetheless contends that the
Commissioner's interpretation of the Appellate Division, First Department's holding in Matter of

Siao-Pao v Dennison (51 AD3d I 05 [ 1sr Dept 2008], affd II NY3d 777 [2008]) was misplaced.
See petitioner's mem of law at 23 -24. They specifically argue that the Parole Board's discussion
of domestic abuse with Hanna at her January 10, 2017 hearing was not "a fact driven inquiry like
the one found in [Siao-Pao ],"because the Parole Board "made statements that contradicted the
evidence in the record, revealing that the Board was doing much more than assessing the veracity
of her claims of abuse." !d. (emphasis in original). However, the court has reviewed both the
administrative record and the transcript of the January I 0, 2017 hearing, and has not discovered

9
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any such "contradictions." Instead, counsel appears to have inferred the existence of these
alleged contradictions from the wording of the Parole Board's questions. By contrast, the
Commissioner's office noted that Hanna herself had initiated the colloquy with the Parole Board
commissioners on the topic of domestic abuse, and that the Board members had restricted their
ensuing questions to matters that were contained in Hanna's PSI and the other material in the
administrative record. By failing to offer either factual evidence of their purported
"contradictions," or to identify legal grounds for their apparent inference that the Parole Board
had made any such "contradictions," counsel for Hanna have failed to demonstrate that the
Commissioner made an improper determination about the Parole Board's handling of the
domestic abuse questioning. Therefore, the .court rejects Hanna's "domestic abuse" argument.
As was previously noted, Hanna's second, "personal beliefs" argument, specified three
matters about which counsel found Parole Board questioning objectionable. The third of these
was the Parole Board's alleged reliance·on its "personal beliefs about her ... crime." See
petitioner's mem of law at l 5. However, Hanna's memorandum of Jaw is devoid of argument on
this point. As a result, the court deems that Hanna has abandoned this portion of her second
argument (although she does raise apparently related arguments in other portions of her
memorandum). Therefore, the cou11 rejects Hanna's second argument in ful l.
Next, counsel for Hanna argues that ''the Parole Board violated lawful procedure by
failing to meaningfully consider the required statutory factors." See petitioner's mem of law at
24-30. To recount, Exec Law§ 259-i (2) (c) (A) enumerates the eight factors to be considered:
(1) the inmate's insti tutional record; (2) the inmate!s performance in a temporary release

program; (3) the inmate 's release plans; (4) any federa l deportation order issued against the
10
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inmate; (5) any current or prior statement made to the board by the crime victim; 6) the length of
the determinate sentence to which the inmate would be subject; (7) the seriousness of the .
offens~;

and (8) the inmate's prior criminal record. Counsel for Hanna argues that, at the January

10, 2017 hearing, the Parole Board: I) gave inadequate consideration to Hanna's institutional
record; 2) gave undue consideratio_n to Hanna's offense; and 3) gave inadequate weight to
Hanna's COMPAS score. See petitioner's mem of law at 24-30. The Commissioner's office
reviewed this argument at Hanna's September 1 I, 20 17 administrative appeal hearing,
whereupon it found as follows:
"Appellant's next contentions, that the Board failed to properly consider factors
weighing in favor of release and instead denied parole based upon the severity of
the offense alone, are without merit. The record reflects that the Board
considered, in addition to the severity of the offense, appellant's release plans,
discipl inary history, programming and vocational achievements, her parole packet,
which inc] uded her statement of remorse and letters in support of release, the
COMPAS risk and needs assessment administered by DOCCS, and the minutes
from her sentencing hearing (during which the Court stated that appellant should
'receive a greater sentence than that which has been agreed upon between the
District Attorney's office and the families of both Mr. Rubel and Ms. Hanna'), as
well as the previously discussed official opposition and mental health status.
Additionally, at the end of the interview, appellant was given an opportunity to
make a statement and she declined to address any other factors.
"Thus, the record reflects that the Board properly considered factors weighing in
favor of release. That the Board may have accorded more weight to the severity
of the offense does not render the decision infirm. It is well settled that the weight
to be accorded each of the requisite factors is within the discretion ofthe Board,
(see e.g. Matter of King v Stanford, I 3 7 AD3d 1396 [3d Dept 20 16]; Matter of
Delacruz v Annucci, 122 AD3d 1413, [4th Dept 2014)). The Board is neither
required to place equal emphasis on each factor (see Matter of Martinez v Evans,
108 AD3d 815, 816 [2d Dept. 20 13]; Matter of Comfort v New York Slate Div. of
Parole, 68 AD3d 1295, 1296 [3d Dept 2009)) nor required to place more
emphasis on appellant's achievements and rehabilitative successes than on the
severity of the offense (see·Maller of Moore v New York State Bd. of Parole, 137
AD3d 1375 [3d Dept. 2016]). Thus the Board's consideration of the severity of
the offense was not improper (see Matter of LeGeros v New York State Bd. of
II
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. Parole, 139 AD3d 1068, 1069 [2d Dept. 2016])."
See petition, exhibit R. In Hanna's petition, counsel cite a quantity of case law in which Parole
Board denials were overturned because the Board's decisions were overly reliant on the
"seriousness of the offense" factor, while they merely mentioned the "institutional record" factor
and the other factors in passing. See, e.g., Matter of Ramirez v Evans, 1I8 AD3d 707 (2d Dept
2014); Maller of Perfetto v Evans, 112 AD3d 640 (2d Dept 2013); Maller of King v New York

State Div. of Parole, 190 AD2d 423 (1 ~~Dept 1993), affd 83 NY2d 788 (I 994). Counsel urges
that the Commissioner's office should have applied this line of case law to Hanna's parole
.

.

application, rather than the precedent that it relied on in the September 11, 2017 administrative
appeal decision, because the Parole Board 's January I 0, 20 I 7 decision did just that. See
petitioner's mem of law at 24-30. The court disagrees. All of the case law that Hanna 's counsel
cited involved parole Board decisions that - in addition to overemphasizing the "seriousness of
the offen se" factor and merely mentioning the other factors in passing - were "set forth in

conclusory terms, which is contrary to law." Matter of Ramirez v Evans, 1I8 AD3d at 707
[emphasis added). When a decision contains these three features, a court may justly infer that the
Board has ignored its duty to consider all of the statutory release factors .s et forth in Exec Law §
259-i (2) (c) (A), and simply given undue weight to the seriousness of an inmate's offense.
However, the instant January I 0, 20I7 Parole board decision cannot be characterized as
"conclusory." Instead, it is apparent that the Board observed a worrisome qisconnect between
the overall picture of stabi lity that is presented by Hanna's positive institutional record and
COMPAS Risk and Needs Assessment score, etc., and her own, less positive self-evaluation.

See petition, exhibit A. It is evident that this Board did not ignore the other parole det~rmination
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factors set forth in Exec La.w § 259-i (2) (c) (A) in favor of the "seriousness of the offense"
factor, but rather that the Board accorded that factor greater weight after considering them all.
The Commissioner's office was correct to note that the applicable case law accords the Parole
Board the discretion to proceed in this manner. See e.g. Matter of Moore v New York State Bd. of

Parole, 137 AD3d 1375, 1376 (3d Dept 2016). As a result, the Commissioner's office's
determination of the "statutory factors" argument was arrived at reasonably, in accordance with
the law, and dis not constitute an act of"irrationality bordering on impropriety." Therefore, the
court rejects Hanna's third argument.
Next, counsel for Hanna argues that "the Parole Board 's deci sion was arbitrary and
capricious because it gave impermissible weight to the seriousness of the crime." See
petitioner's mem of law at 30-35. However, the court has ·already rejected this contention for the
reasons set fo~th above, Therefore, the court also rejects Hanna's fourth argument _for those same
reasons.
Finally, counsel for Hanna argues that "the Parole Board's decision was unlawful because
it failed to explain its denial in detailed and non-conclusory terms, and its determination is not
supported by the record." See petitioner's mem of law at 36-39. However, as was discussed
above, "conclusory" is an inaccurate characterization of the Parole Board's January I 0, 20 17
determination. There fore, the court rejects Hanna' s fifth argument. Accordingly, having found
that none of her arguments are meritorious, the court find s that the Commissioner's decision was
not "arbitrary and capricious," and that Hanna's Article 78 petition should be dismissed.
.
.
DECISION
ACCORDINGLY, for the foregoing reasons it is hereby

'
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ADJl)DGED that the petition <;>f for relief, pursuant to CPLR Article 78, of petitioner
Gai l Hanna is denied, and the petition is dismissed. And it is further

ORDERED that counsel for Petitioner shall serve a copy of this Order with Notice of
Entry within twenty (20) days of entry on counsel for Respondent.

Dated: New York , New York
May 29, 2018

ENTER:

.~I{SL-£.
Hon. Carol R. Edmead, JSC

HON. CAA.OL R.

EDIViEAD
J.S.C.
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